CURRENT DECISIONS by unknown
CURRENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITy-ARBITRATIoN 
AGREEMENTS.-BY the terms of the New
York Statute "a provision in a contract 
to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising . . . shall be valid, enforceable, 
and irrevocable." . . The
plaintiff in disregard of such a provision 
in the contract brought an action for 
a
breach without referring to arbitration. 
Held, that the statute was constitutional
and that the plaintiff could not recover. 
In re Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg
(1921) 230 N. Y. 261, 13o N. E. 288.
The instant case, under the statute, is in 
line with the growing tendency toward
the recognition of the validity of all arbitration 
agreements. Such agreements
are not in fact contrary to public policy 
as ousting courts of jurisdiction, for
an unfair award could only be enforced by 
recourse to the court, while in the case
of a fair award, the parties have settled the 
very matters which otherwise would
have been litigated. Furthermore there 
is no objection to making arbitration
agreements irrevocable, since equity will enjoin 
an action 'for the enforcement
of an unfair award.. See Anson, Contract 
(Corbin's ed. igig) sec. 251 a. See
also supra, p. 862.
INsURANcE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES-RIGHTS 
OF CREDITORS WHERE INSURED
RESERVES POWER TO CHANGE BENFlIciARY.-The 
insured was the holder of a
policy in which his wife was beneficiary, the power 
to change the beneficiary,
with the consent of the insurer, having 
been reserved by the insured. The
trustee in bankruptcy of the insured demanded 
the surrender value of the policy
from the insurer, who contended that it could 
refuse to consent to a change of
beneficiary. Held, that the trustee's claim could 
not be defeated by the company's
refusal. Ward, J., dissenting. In re Greenberg; 
Petition of Hancock Mit.
Life Ins. Co. (Jan. 14, i921) U. S. C. C. A. 
2d, Oct. Term, i92o, No. 112.
A beneficiary, gets merely an expectancy where 
the insured reserves the power
to change the beneficiary. Vance, Insurance 
(1904) 399; 2 Joyce, Insurance
(2d ed. 1917) sec. 74o; see also (1918) 28 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL, 89. The retention
of the power to change the beneficiary gives 
rights to the creditors superior to
those of the beneficiary. Cohen v. Samuels 
(I917) 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36.
A general power of appointment, the non-execution 
of which is not aided at
common law, -when retained by the insured, 
is made assets by section 7o-a of
the Bankruptcy Act, it being a power which 
the donee might have exercised
for his benefit. The principal case extends the decision in Cohen 
v. Samuels,
supra, in which case the consent of the insurer 
to a change in the beneficiary
was not stipulated f6r in the policy. As to 
the validity of the requirement of
the insurer's consent to a change of beneficiary, 
see (ii8) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 957.
QUASICONTRACrSr CONTRIBUTION 
BETWEEN JOINT ToRT-FEASRS.--The plaintiff
obtained a judgment .against the White Bus 
Line and one Stiles, jointly, for
injuries inflicted by their concurrent negligence. 
The Bus Line was insured
and the insurance company paid the judgment, 
but, instead of entering satisfac-
tion thereon, assigned it to the Bus Line. Stiles 
applied to the court for an
order directing satisfaction to be entered. An 
order was made as requested and
the Bus Line appealed. Held, that -Stiles was 
entitled to the order, on the
ground that contribution would not be allowed 
between joint tort-feasors.
Adams v. White Bus Line (1921, Calif.) 195 Pac. 389.
The so-called general rule upon which the court 
rests its decision-if it ever
was the law-has had so many exceptions grafted 
upon it that it is now general
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only in name. See (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 527. While the majority
of cases still deny contributi6n where the joint wrong was merely negligent,
there is a strong and growing minority which allows contribution in all cases
except of conscious or wilful wrongdoers. Cf. Hobbs v. Hurley (1918) n17 Me.449, io4 Atl. 815.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-ATTRArns NUISANE.-The defendant maintained elec-
tric wires across the top of a bridge and about 24 feet above the roadway.
There was. evidence that small boys had, to the knowledge of the defendant,
climbed up on the girders at the top of the bridge. The plaintiff, a boy of
eight, climbed up there to get a pigeon's nest. He saw a pigeon on one of the
defendant's wires and reached out to catch it. In so doing he touched a live wire
and received the injuries for which this action was brought. Held, that the
plaintiff could recover, on the ground that the wires, in connection with the
surrounding circumstances, constituted an "attractive nuisance." N. Y., N. H.,
& H. ,Ry. v. Fruchter (Feb. 9, i92I) U. ,S. C. C. Az 2d, Oct. Term, I92o, Nos.
152-153.
The attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply where the property owner
could not carry on his lawful business in the necessary and ordinary manner
and at the same' time, safeguard trespassing children. See (1915) 25 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 84. If an electric wire on the top of a bridge 24 feet high is
an attractive nuisance, it is difficult to see how a landowner can escape liability
for any injury which trespassing children incur on his p, emises. On similar facts
a recent well-considered case reached the opposite result. Davis v. Malvern Lt.
& Power Co. (i919, Iowa) 173 N. W. 262, discussed in COMMENTS (1919) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 223.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PluvAcy.-The plaintiff had presented the defendants'
predecessors in title with a portrait bust of himsilf to be used as a trade-mark.
The defendants later published the features of the bust placed on the body of a
foppish figure for advertisement. The plaintiff obtained leave to serve a writ
of summons upon the defendants in an action for an injunction to restrain this
publication. The defendants' motion to set aside this writ was discharged by
.the lower court, and the defendants brought this appeal. Held, that the appeal be
dismissed, since it had not been shown that the lower court had proceeded upon
any wrong principle. Dunlop Rubber. Co., Ltd. v. Dunlop (192o, H. L.) 37 T.
L. R. 245.,
The decision, in recognizing that the exhibition of these pictures "amounted
to something which was at least capable of a defamatory meaning," seems to
be enforcing what American courts term "the right of privacy." For an early
discussion see Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (i8go) 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193. See also COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 450 (discussing
the New York statute); COMMENTS, (1919) 28 id. 269; COMMENTS (1910)
20 id. I49; COMMENTS (igo8) Ig id. 123.
